Investigating Russian Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation Risk

In March of this year, the U.S. Government expanded sanctions and export restrictions to 19 entities for their activities in support of the proliferation of Russian chemical and biological weapons. The move followed a determination by the U.S. Secretary of State that the Government of Russia had used a chemical weapon in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Sayari has conducted a thorough analysis of these 19 entities, including identifying key transactional counterparties, co-located entities, as well as common typologies associated with them. This webinar will serve to pass on these findings and better equip attendees with the tools and knowledge to avoid these networks, and more generally Russian chemical and biological weapons proliferation.

Join us to learn to identify and follow the typologies and features associated with entities exposed to Russian chemical and biological weapons proliferation through the lens of a recent Sayari investigation.

You will learn about:

• The basic features and structures of the six research institutes among the 19 entities – what to look for when examining them, as well as what challenges they present from a research perspective.
• The potential risks posed by third-party entities which share addresses with the chemical and biological research institutes. We will cover how these entities could potentially import materials used in the production of chemical and biological weapons to the campuses of the blocked research institutes.
• How the supply chain for the state-owned research institutes differs from that of the private institutes included on the list of 19. You will also learn where transaction data lies for each type of entity and how to adjust your own investigations accordingly.

Reasons to watch:

• The precursor materials for chemical and biological weapons are often the same as those used in the production of benign products such as pesticides. Because of this, it is easy to potentially send materials to entities that are engaged in or in close proximity to chemical and biological weapon proliferation. Our session will arm you with the know how to protect yourself against such outcomes.
• The 19 entities related to chemical and biological weapons proliferation differ in a number of key ways from other designated entities – such as those in Section 231 of CAATSA – therefore it is important to adjust your methodology before conducting due diligence or network analysis on them – we will explain what we learned from our own experiences in this regard.
• Walk away with a clear understanding of the required resources for investigating these entities and will be able to confidently navigate the Russian public records landscape, even if you don’t speak Russian.