Proposed amendments to the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which sets the annual budget and policies for the Department of Defense (DoD), call for increased scrutiny of contractors supporting the department’s operations.
Amendments call for vendor vetting and central database
In July, Iowa Senator Joni Ernst proposed a new amendment to the 2026 NDAA, the Assessment of Foreign Ownership Contractors, to purge Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence from U.S. defense supply chains. The proposal calls for the vetting of contractors for
“membership, affiliation, or participation” in foreign malign influence programs such as the Central United Front Work Department (UFWD), the CCP’s influence and intelligence service.
The amendment gives the DoD one year to formalize its vetting policies for defense contractors. Failure to comply with this deadline would result in the cancellation of “all contracts and subcontracts with contractors and subcontractors not assessed for risks related to foreign ownership, control, or influence.”
“Before this amendment, there was no clear path forward for assessing or conducting due diligence on foreign ownership, control, and influence — the DoD largely relied on self-reporting. [Ernst’s amendment] is a requirement for an assessment and mitigation plan of DoD contractor risks associated with foreign ownership, control, and influence,” a former U.S. Air Force intelligence analyst said.
Ernst’s proposed amendment is in addition to language in the House of Representatives draft version of the NDAA that mandates creation of a “Clandestine Activities Vendor Database” of contractors used in covert operations. Aimed at deconflicting clandestine activities and reducing operational risk and counterintelligence exposure, the text requires the DoD to “establish, maintain, and continuously update a secure, centralized database containing a list of all commercial vendors that perform work for the Department of Defense in support of a clandestine activity.”
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees have passed their respective versions of the 2026 NDAA. The two committees must now reconcile their differing proposals before a final bill can be voted on by Congress.
>> See how Sayari data illuminated the national security risks of a CCP-linked researcher <<
Increased vendor scrutiny is a global push
These proposed NDAA amendments reflect a push for increased scrutiny on defense contractors for ties to foreign governments. In response, organizations must move beyond vendor self-disclosures to deeper, independent verification of contractor bona fides.
Organizations must understand their vendors not just deeply, but broadly. Third-party risks can have disproportionate impacts, a concern also highlighted in expanding global regulatory obligations. Similar to the NDAA, the European Defence Industry Programme and European Defence Industrial Strategy aim to enhance the EU’s defense industrial readiness and ensure the availability and supply of defense products. Failure to comply can result in significant fines, contract suspension, legal action, or reputational damage.
Validating third-party risk is no longer a best practice for organizations — it is increasingly a regulatory imperative.
How Sayari helps organizations go beyond vendor self-disclosure
Sayari’s comprehensive corporate records provide the essential intelligence layer that empowers organizations to rapidly identify and mitigate risks from foreign ownership and control. By offering deep insight into beneficial ownership and potential red flags such as connections to sanctioned entities, Sayari provides a reliable means of validating vendor self-disclosures and enables a comprehensive due diligence approach that goes beyond the vendor’s disclosure.
For more information on how Sayari can help you identify foreign influence risks and vet vendors, read our report Aerospace and Defense: Sayari for Enhanced Vendor Vetting and Accreditation.
