Emily Alexander Sayari
Based on analysis by

Emily Alexander

Deputy General Counsel

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Critical Minerals: How The UK Government is Addressing the Supply Chain Risk

For UK government contractors, proving where your critical minerals come from is shifting from policy debate to procurement expectation.

In this Article

On November 5, 2026, a House of Commons committee reported that Britain is still “dangerously” dependent on China for critical minerals, and set out a five-part plan to “precision de-risk” the country’s most exposed supply chains.

This is a committee report, not a law, and the Government does not have to act on any of it. But it lands in the same place as binding US rules like Executive Order 14415. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic now treat critical-mineral supply chains as an urgent national security question, and the job of proving where materials come from is moving onto the companies that supply the government. If you sell to the UK public sector, you should start building that visibility now.

What the UK Committee Said

The Business, Innovation, Science and Trade Committee published two reports: “China and the UK economy: the case for risk-managed growth” on November 2, and “Critical minerals” on November 5. Its headline finding is that, sixteen years after China first used its grip on rare earths as leverage, the UK is still exposed.

By the committee’s count, China is the leading refiner for 19 of the 20 strategic minerals the International Energy Agency tracks, at an average market share near 70%. Chair Liam Byrne did not hedge: “Critical minerals are the alpha of the new economy. We cannot re-arm Britain, build AI or deliver net zero unless we secure the minerals these technologies depend on.”

The committee’s five-part plan to “precision de-risk” Britain’s dependencies is:

  • Name the “sovereign capabilities” Britain has to protect, and map what minerals they need.
  • Build domestic mining, processing, and recycling where relying on China is too risky.
  • Stand up a Critical Minerals Finance Facility to back strategic projects with equity, loans, long-term offtake deals, and price floors.
  • Pool buying power with allies through “buyers’ clubs” to split the cost of new mines and smelters, which can run near $3 billion each.
  • Let British International Investment take equity stakes in overseas mining, and widen UK Export Finance’s remit to cover economic security.

By convention the Government will respond within about two months, though it is free to adopt none of this.

The Same Direction as the US

The US is already writing visibility into defense contracts. While the UK is still at the strategy stage, the parallels are striking.

DimensionUnited States (EO 14415)United Kingdom (Committee report)
Legal forceBinding executive order with set deadlinesCommittee recommendations; Government response expected within about two months
Core concernDefense supply chains dependent on adversary-sourced materialsEconomic security and reliance on China for refined critical minerals
Main toolContract mandates: mapping, supplier vetting, waiver cutoffsIndustrial strategy: financing, allied buyers’ clubs, domestic capacity
Where the burden landsContractors and subs at any tier must trace and discloseNot required yet, but the direction points to provenance and disclosure expectations for government suppliers

The logic is the same, and the UK report calls specifically for working with allies. When one close ally writes supply chain illumination into its procurement, it tends to be a preview of where the rest are headed. We may expect the same trend to reach the EU.

What the Committee’s Approach Signals

The committee’s language is deliberate. “Precision de-risk” steps back from blanket decoupling. The committee is not telling Britain to cut China out entirely. It is telling Britain to find the specific dependencies that matter most and deal with those. We can expect any binding measures to focus on critical materials, similar to the US approach.

There are key differences in approach. The US led with a mandate and left industry to sort out the mechanism. The UK is doing the reverse, leading with financing through a proposed Critical Minerals Finance Facility and allied buyers’ clubs, and leaving disclosure requirements for later.

The call to work with allies is also a telling addition to the report. If the UK lines up procurement expectations with allies who already regulate this issue, then we can expect UK defense contractors to have similar disclosure requirements to allied countries like the US and potentially later the EU. Contractors should closely watch the rules in these jurisdictions.

What It Means for UK Government Contractors

  • Expect provenance questions in UK tenders. “Where do your critical inputs come from, and who controls those suppliers” might be questions that come up more often in security reviews.
  • Look past your direct vendors. The committee’s worry is dependence that sits several layers deep in your supply chain. If you map only the suppliers you contract with, you will miss it.
  • Create compliance efficiencies to comply with multiple regimes. If you sell to governments on both sides of the Atlantic, build a single supply chain visibility capability that can answer both, instead of two separate compliance exercises.
  • Watch the Government’s response. The two-month reply window will signal whether this turns into a requirement.

The Takeaway

The UK and US are looking at the same problem from different ends. Critical minerals have become a true national security concern, and governments increasingly expect their suppliers to understand their own exposure and prove it. The UK has not made that a legal requirement yet but it’s safe to expect it will.

This blog is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. If you supply the UK or US government, please work with your own counsel on how these developments apply to your specific supply chain.

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