In May 2024, the Centers for Disease Control reported a decrease in drug overdose-related deaths for the first time since 2018. This change is thanks in part to concerted efforts by regulators, law enforcement, and private sector investigators to stem the flow of fentanyl and its chemical precursors into the United States. But synthetic opioids still claim tens of thousands of American lives each year, and the illicit networks responsible are constantly adapting to counter-narcotic programs.
Public data is vital to the ability to identify these risky networks quickly, effectively, and at scale, no matter what jurisdictional challenges investigators might face.
Investigate Chinese Fentanyl Precursor Producers with OSINT Methods
When tracking down fentanyl networks with publicly available information, investigators should use a number of different strategies. One effective method is to combine social media intelligence and OSINT techniques with public records to identify precursor producers. In the following example case, you’ll learn repeatable strategies for uncovering these illicit networks.
When investigating Chinese companies advertising precursors, a common search query in Google or Baidu, China’s main search engine, might include a particular CAS number for that precursor and then “Mexico.” CAS Registry Numbers are universally used to provide a unique, unmistakable identifier for chemical substances.
Following the 2023 Biden-Xi summit, China pledged to take steps to crack down on these sellers and take down these sites. However, there is evidence of Chinese firms continuing to market these precursors. For example, searching CAS number 79099-07-3, which is associated with the fentanyl precursor 1-BOC-4-Piperidone, will lead you to a website such as the one below, Hebei Yingong. The Hebei Yingong website brazenly markets the chemical as “the hot new product that is taking Mexico by storm!”
The website also lists contact information at the bottom. The email in the screenshot is associated with a LinkedIn profile for a “Lisa Lau” who claims to be based in Los Angeles. In her LinkedIn profile you can see that in addition to Hebei Yingong, Lisa Lau used to work for Hebei Huanhao Biotech.
The next step in this investigative process is to verify what you’ve found with OSINT and SOCMINT techniques in a risk intelligence platform like Sayari Graph. In platforms like Graph, you can view company profiles based on Chinese corporate data, including information such as shareholders, directors, and supervisors, combined with other types of data from different jurisdictions. In this case, you’ll find that Hebei Huanhao Biotech is sanctioned by the United States, listed under an Illicit Drugs Executive Order on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List.
According to this SDN listing, Hebei Huanhao Biotech has imported and exported chemical and pharmaceutical products used to produce opioids. The company has also advertised or supplied fentanyl precursor chemicals using business-to-business chemical marketplaces and has been involved in producing fentanyl precursors. Lisa Lau’s connection to both Huanhao and Yingong only strengthens the case that Hebei Yingong is another supplier involved in the same trade.
Using these methods, regulators, enforcers, and investigators can better understand fentanyl trafficking in order to dismantle these networks. To learn other methods for investigating illicit fentanyl networks and to see more example cases, watch our latest webinar, Tracing the Flow of Fentanyl and Chemical Precursors into the United States.